I. Introduction
T HIS paper presents a new measure of the effective protection rate which takes into account the existence of uncertainty and stock market valuation of random returns. The new measure-the Risk-Adjusted Effective Protection Rate (RAEPR)-uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to demonstrate the dependence of the rate of protection on an industry's risk. We prove that when the tariff on the final good is greater (smaller) than the weighted average tariff on traded inputs,1 the effective protection increases (decreases) as one moves from an industry with low risk (or low beta) to one with high risk (or high beta) other things held constant. We also show how the measure can be calculated empirically and present several illustrations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the effective protection rate is defined in both a deterministic and an uncertain environment. The RAEPR is presented in section III, the empirical methodology and some illustrations of the measure from U.S. industries in section IV. The empirical findings are placed in perspective in the final section.
I1. The Effective Protection Rate in Deterministic and in Uncertain Environments
By specifying the effects of tariffs on the value added of an industry rather than on the price of the final output of the protected industry, the effective protection rate analyzes how the structure of nominal tariffs affects the production pattern of a country. It is defined as the percentage increase in the value added as a result of the tariff structure, i.e., g -(Vj -V)/V, where V' and V are the value added per unit of output with and without protection.
In a deterministic framework, the free trade value added per unit of industry i, i = 1,.. ., n, is Note that several assumptions are made above which are common to some of the theoretical studies (for example, Ruffin (1969) ) and most of the empirical studies (for example, Balassa (1965)) on the DEPR. The first is that the tariff is fully effective, i.e., it raises the domestic good's price by the full amount of the tariff. We also assume that the coefficients aij are constants and that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. These assumptions will be maintained throughout the analysis.
Consider the effective protection rate in an uncertain environment where a stock market exists. for a= 1,2,...,S; i= 1,...,n. Note that the choice of factor inputs is made by firms before the realization of a state of the world. The choice is made so as to maximize the firm's net value on the stock market. We assume that initial stockholders bear all factor costs. Thus, the return to the investors (in gross terms) is the value of the output produced, since their initial investment entitles them to a claim on the total output. 
III. The Risk-Adjusted Effective Protection Rate
In order to derive more specific results concerning the variations in the effective protection rate under uncertainty as the industry risk varies and to apply this measure empirically, we must impose restrictive assumptions on the investor's preferences. We assume that the investor is a mean-variance maximizer. This assumption is commonly used in the theory of finance, and it enables us to derive a risk-adjusted effective protection rate by making use of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.6
According to the CAPM, in equilibrium all securities will lie along the line called the Security Market Line. Since investors are risk averse, increasing increments of compensation (expected return) are required if they are to bear increasing 3 This might appear incongruous with the spirit of effective protection since inputs and outputs are not treated symmetrically. However, in order to determine effective protection in an industry, resource flow to that industry must be given. 4Alternatively, the firm can finance purchase of inputs either by new equities alone or by a combination of equities and bonds (see Helpman and Razin (1978) Recall that Ri, which was derived from the S.M.L., is likely to be different across industries, reflecting the risk involved in the production. Therefore, even with the same nominal tariffs on traded inputs and on final goods, as well as the same input coefficients, effective protection rates will vary because of the different risks involved in the production of the two goods. This may be summarized as: The usual case is ti > t, so that the effective protection increases as we move from an industry with low risk (h) to an industry with high risk (i), holding other things constant. The economic reasoning underlying this result is that when the risk associated with the industry involved increases, the certainty equivalent of the uncertain value added (the present value of the uncertain value added) decreases, because the risk-adjusted discount rate increases. This decrease in the value added leads, other things constant, to an increase in the effective protection rate (see Corden (1971) , p. 36).
IV. Empirical Methodology and Some Illustrations
In this section we provide an empirical methodology for estimating the new measure, the RAEPR, as well as some illustrations from U.S. industries. To do this, we must first modify equations (1) and (5) so that they will accommodate the available data.
Denote t as the weighted average of all input tariffs, and Lai Pj as the total cost of material. Then (1) (1 + t) .
The industry's risk-adjusted discount rate Ri, sometimes called the true cost of capital, is measured by making use of (3) which is the main equation of the CAPM. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we use, as is standard, the Treasury bill rate which on January 10, 1977 was 4.3%. The difference between the return on the market and the risk-free rate has been termed the market risk-premium whose average over the past 50 years has been 8.8% per annum. The third input to equation (3), the industry asset beta, is quite difficult to assess. It depends on the sensitivity of the demand for the industry product or services and on its cost of factor of production. Hence, one may expect industries characterized by highly cyclical demand and/or large fixed cost to have higher betas than those in industries with more stable demand and/or greater freedom to vary cost. In order to arrive at estimates of an industry's asset betas, one might use the available estimates of the industry's equity betas as a benchmark, since the beta value of the industry's stock depends on the beta of its assets and its degree of financial leverage. This In determining the tariffs either on individual inputs or on the final output, we referred to a publication called tariff schedule of the United States Annotated (1981). This publication lists three different tariffs regarding each article. The lowest rate applies to the products of a very few LeastDeveloped-Developing-Countries.
The highest rate applies to the products of Communist Countries except China. The third tariff (the MostFavored-Nation), which is adopted by this study, applies to all other countries.
In determining the industry equity beta, the industry long-term debt, and the industry market value at the beginning of 1977, we referred to unpublished material by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. Table 2 presents the statistics for the 4-digit industries underlying the above three aggregated industries. When we moved from the aggregative level to the 4-digit level, we assumed that both had the same asset beta.
V. Empirical Findings
The results concerning the nominal tariffs (NTs), DEPRs and the RAEPRs are presented in the second column and the last two columns of tables 1 and 2. It is apparent that the differences either between the NTs and EPRs, or between EPRs and RAEPRs are not substantial. The reason is that these illustrations are based on U.S. data where the value added is especially large, while the systematic risk and nominal tariffs are very small. For example, the value added in the drugs industry is 72%, and the weighted average on inputs is almost half of the tariff on the final product. Hence, the difference between NT and EPR is only 2.5%. These reasons also account for the small difference (0.4%) between the RAEPR and the EPR. In addition to these, the systematic risk and therefore the discount factor are very small in the United States by comparison to other countries. Solnik (1974) has found that while the systematic risk (i.e., the risk that cannot be diversified away by investing in a large number of stocks) in the United States is only 27% of the total risk, it is 7Such an assumption is used in Brealy and Myers (1981, p. 169). It does not exclude bankruptcy possibilities. 
